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
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14 October 1966

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# WEEKLY SUMMARY

MOR/CDF 207939 Pages 1, 3, 10

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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
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PREMIER SECURES DISSOLUTION OF LAOTIAN ASSEMBLY  
Souvanna's triumph, however, may complicate his working  
relations with the next assembly, tentatively to be  
elected on 1 January. Many of the dismissed deputies  
will probably be re-elected.

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Middle East - Africa

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NEW INCIDENTS STIR ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS  
The Israelis' reaction has been restrained, but they probably would respond to any further terrorism by attacking Syria, which they blame for recent incidents.

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USSR CONTINUES SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID TO ALGERIA  
The fall from power of pro-Soviet president Ben Bella has not disrupted the flow of equipment. Some \$150 million worth has arrived over the past three years.

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


Western Hemisphere

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


CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR

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The assembly elected this Sunday is to replace the constitution considered to have lapsed when the Arosemena government was overthrown in 1963. The shattered center-left parties may unite to try to block conservative control of the assembly. Scattered pre-election violence is likely.

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## PREMIER SECURES DISSOLUTION OF LAOTIAN ASSEMBLY

The dissolution of Laos' National Assembly on 7 October by King Savang provided Premier Souvanna with at least an initial victory over its members who had sought a greater role in the government. Souvanna's triumph, however, may complicate his working relations with the next assembly, tentatively to be elected on 1 January. Many of the dismissed deputies will probably be re-elected.

The political tensions between the premier and the assembly began rising in mid-August when rightist deputies pressed for a greater role in the government. Their demands that some of their number be named to vacant cabinet positions were never satisfied and at the end of August the assembly threatened Souvanna with a vote of no confidence.

The final crisis was precipitated by the assembly's rejection on 16 September of the proposed government budget. Although certain older deputies reportedly regretted the assembly's haste and sought a compromise, possibly including a resubmission of the budget, Souvanna refused conciliation. Scornful of the deputies' "ineptness" but unwilling to act against them without King Savang's backing, he succeeded in gaining the King's reluctant agreement to dissolve the assembly.

Although very sensitive to Vientiane's need for internal stability, Souvanna allowed his personal contempt for some of the deputies to color his reaction to the assembly's public opposition. The King and the more responsible members of the National Assembly were offended by Souvanna's intemperate attacks on the character of the assembly deputies. The memory of his unwillingness even to consider any compromise, which would have spelled less than total defeat for the deputies, will certainly impede effective cooperation between him and the new body.

An intensive period of political maneuvering is likely before the elections. If current election laws continue in force, the rightists will receive the greatest benefit. Supported by the army, the rightists will expect to pick up representation in the assembly at the expense of the neutralist faction. Souvanna probably favors a strengthening of the rightist position since he has personally moved in that direction during the past two years. The neutralists, already weakened by defections, will continue to lose strength. The Communists will boycott the elections as they have in the past.

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### NEW INCIDENTS STIR ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS

Two incidents in the past week have heightened Arab-Israeli tensions. On 7 October an apartment house in the Israeli-controlled section of Jerusalem was slightly damaged by explosives and the following day four Israeli policemen were killed by a mine near the Syrian border. The Israeli Government is under considerable domestic pressure to hit back at Syria, which is considered responsible for both incidents.

So far the official reaction is restrained, however. Israel has asked for a UN Security Council meeting to consider Syrian "aggression."

This appears designed in part to justify a possible future retaliatory strike, and any further terrorist acts would almost certainly draw an aggressive Israeli military response.

Syrian Prime Minister Zuayyin has stated that Syria could not be the guardian of Israel's security and safety. In fact, the Damascus military regime probably does not have the capability of fully controlling the terrorist organization, even if it wanted to do so.

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**SECRET****USSR CONTINUES SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AID TO ALGERIA**

The Soviet Union has continued to deliver substantial quantities of military equipment to Algeria even after the overthrow of pro-Soviet president Ben Bella last year. The shipments are part of an effort by the USSR, which has established its presence in the Middle East, to extend its influence to the western Mediterranean.

At least \$150 million worth of equipment has arrived in Algeria since it signed the first formal military aid agreement with the Soviets in the fall of 1963, making it the major military power in North Africa west of Egypt.

**MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED  
TO ALGERIA**

	MINIMUM IN 1966	TOTAL (Aid began in 1963)
<u>AIRCRAFT:</u>		
IL-28 light jet bombers	6	18
MIG-21 jet fighters	20	29
MIG-15/17 jet fighters	20	44
AN-12 transports	0	7
MI-4 helicopters	22	39
<u>LAND ARMAMENT:</u>		
Medium tanks	23	275
Personnel carriers	128	305
Self-propelled assault guns	32	50
Artillery	23	625
Surface-to-air missile equipment	Some	Some
<u>NAVAL SHIPS:</u>		
Submarine chasers	0	3
Motor torpedo boats (P-6)	0	6
Auxiliary ships	1	2

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In the past six months at least [ ] Soviet freighters have carried military cargoes to Algeria. Deliveries have included jet fighter aircraft, jet light bombers, helicopters, surface-to-air missile (SAM) equipment, and a wide assortment of ground forces equipment. Additional SAM equipment deliveries are expected over the next few years as training courses are completed and the system is deployed.

The most recent naval deliveries occurred from October 1965 to last January. During that period three SO-1 submarine chasers and a Poluchat torpedo retriever arrived.

The lack of trained personnel prevents Algeria from effectively using much of the equipment so far received. [ ] Algerians presently are undergoing training in the USSR, however.

Until recently Moscow had not pushed economic assistance to Algeria.

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**SECRET****CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN ECUADOR**

On 16 October some 700,000 Ecuadoreans are expected to go to the polls to elect 67 delegates to a constituent assembly scheduled to convene on 3 November. Twelve functional delegates, representing such interest groups as commerce, labor, and education, have already been selected.

The assembly's primary function is to produce a new constitution to replace that of 1946, which is considered to have lapsed when the military overthrew the Arosemena government in July 1963. Its most important immediate task, however, will be to select a successor to interim President Yerovi, who hands over his powers to the assembly as soon as it convenes.

The public has been generally indifferent toward the elections because of its contempt for and distrust of politicians, and because of the lack of exciting political issues or personalities. Nevertheless, the prospect of holding office has inspired an excessive number of political groups to put up candidates. In Pichincha (Quito) Province alone, 14 separate parties have entered lists. In Guayas (Guayaquil) Province, 15 groups are running candidates.

No single political party or coalition of parties is expected to be able to elect the 40 delegates necessary to control the assembly. The strongest grouping so far is the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a rightist coalition of the Conservative Party and former president Camilo Ponce's Social Christian Movement. The CDU may be able to win 25 to 30 seats. Ponce is the CDU's first choice to replace Yerovi as either provisional or constitutional president. The CDU is strong in the sierra but weak along the coast.

Parties of the center-left are badly shattered and, with the exception of one or two minor groups, remain generally ineffectual. There may be some coalescing of the center-left after the elections to block Ponce and the conservatives from gaining control of the assembly.

Scattered violence is likely in the few days remaining before the elections. One student was killed and several people were wounded during a political rally near Guayaquil on 9 October.

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